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Abstract: We develop a model to study the role of rationality in economics and biol-
ogy. The model’s agents differ continuously in their ability to make rational choices.
The agents’ objective is to ensure their individual survival over time or, equivalently, to
maximize profits. In equilibrium, however, rational agents who maximize their objective
survival probability are, individually and collectively, eliminated by the forces of competi-
tion. Instead of rationality, there emerges a unique distribution of irrational players who
are individually not fit for the struggle of survival. The selection of irrational players over
rational ones relies on the fact that all rational players coordinate on the same optimal
action, which leaves them collectively undiversified and thus vulnerable to aggregate risks.
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1 Introduction
In economics it is commonplace that “man’s ability to operate as a logical animal capable
of systematic empirical induction was itself the direct outcome of the Darwinian struggle
for survival”.2 Most economic models therefore assume that the forces of competition
ensure the elimination of agents who are not capable of profit-maximizing behavior. One
advantage of such rational maximizing behavior is that it is complementary to mathemat-
ical optimization techniques which accommodate systematic model building. Moreover, it
follows from the laws of diminishing marginal returns that most maximization problems
feature unique solutions. Accordingly, rational choice yields unique predictions which
serve as a natural reference point.
1I thank Martin Hellwig, George Loewenstein, Michael Mandler, Carl Christian von Weizsa¨cker, Mar-
tin Salm, and participants of the 2014 MPI seminar in Bonn for comments and questions.
2Samuelson (1972), p. 249. See Friedman (1953), p.22, and Schumpeter (1933) for similar arguments.
See Nelson and Winter (1985) and Winter (1971) for more differentiated references.
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For the present purpose, we summarize the case for rational choice models as follows:
(i) The competitive struggle for survival selects rational agents over those who make mis-
takes. Moreover, (ii) unlike rational maximizing behavior, which is well defined in the
context of mathematical models, irrational “choice” is inherently hard to define and thus
cannot serve as a benchmark.
In this paper, we develop a simple dynamic neoclassical model of “Darwinian adverse
selection”. While the model’s assumptions are neoclassical, its theoretical predictions in-
vert our previous theses (i) and (ii). The model economy is inhabited by agents who differ
continuously in their ability to make rational choices and the agents’ objective is to ensure
their individual survival over time or, equivalently, to maximize profits. And, indeed, the
rational choice by which individuals maximize their individual survival probability will
be uniquely defined. The fact that maximizing behavior is well defined, however, has
the implication that rational players are eliminated by the forces of competition, while
irrational player types, not capable of maximizing, survive.We derive this result for two
standard economic model environments.
The key intuition is very simple: Suppose agents have to choose between two ferry
boats. One is well maintained, the other is leaking. All rational agents will therefore
board the well-maintained ferry, while irrational agents, not capable of maximizing their
individual survival probability, may be found on either boat. Consequently, to ensure
that some irrational players survive, it suffices that one of the two boats does not sink.
Rational players, on the contrary, individually and collectively depend on only one boat.
And thus the probability of some rational players surviving is strictly lower than the
probability of some irrational players surviving. Put differently, individual rationality has
the consequence that it aligns the choices of rational players. Accordingly, rational players
as a group suffer from under-diversification.
Compared to our initial theses (i) and (ii), we therefore find that our model yields
rather different results. Rationality with its unique predictions is the very reason for
the extinction of rational players. Irrational agents, on the contrary, survive not despite,
but because of their individual mistakes. Accordingly, in relation to our first thesis (i),
we derive a simple antithesis (i’): The struggle for survival selects irrational agents, who
make mistakes over those who make no mistakes in the struggle for survival. Moreover,
irrationality serves as the reference point: there exists only one unique distribution of
irrational behavior, which is well defined in the context of analytical model building.
2
In Section 2, we introduce the model and present the main result. In our baseline
model, players are faced with a simple binary choice problem. In Section 3, we drive our
results for a capital market setting where agents can choose from an arbitrary number
of alternatives. Finally, we discuss assumptions, compare our results to the literature on
group selection, and suggest different interpretations. Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
At the beginning of time, entrepreneurs choose between two actions/“production tech-
nologies” A and B. After this choice is made, nature randomly selects between two states
0 and 1. State 0 is selected with probability P > 1/2. State 1 is less likely and occurs
with the residual probability (1 − P ) < 1/2. If state 0 (1) is selected, then technology
A (B) is more productive than technology B (A). Accordingly, if state 0 is selected, the
competitive market system eliminates those firms that chose the inefficient technology B.3
Likewise in state 1, where players with technology B drive those out of the market who
chose A. Agents who used the wrong technology are eliminated. Successful entrepreneurs
move on to the next period where they have to choose once again between two technologies
A and B. Time t goes from t = 0, 1, 2...,∞.
Entrepreneurs differ in types φ ∈ [0, 1]. These types vary continuously from rational
to completely irrational. More precisely, an agent i who is of type φ plays the following
strategies:
Si =


A with probability φ
B with probability 1− φ .
In the following, we identify players’ rationality by their innate probability, φ ∈ [0, 1],
to play the dominant strategy A, which maximizes the individual survival probability.4
Individual profit maximization therefore requires agents to play A all the time and hence
3An economy consistent with such an assumption would, for example, involve the assumption that (i)
goods can be sold at price p ≥ 1, (ii) each entrepreneur has one unit of labor L and needs one “unit” of
income for subsistence/survival, and (iii) production is Y = τiL, i = A,B with τA = 1, τB = 0, in state
0 and τA = 0, τB = 1 in state 1. This environment can be generalized incorporating elastic demand,
varying returns to scale, and production involving several inputs.
4That is, choosing A maximizes both the probability of surviving to the next period as well as the
probability of making a positive profit since the probability P > 1/2 with which A is the superior
technology exceeds the probability 1− P < 1/2 with which B is the superior technology.
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φ = 1 agents are rational. As φ decreases, agents put less and less emphasis on the
dominant action and eventually agents with φ = 0 reliably play B, which minimizes their
survival probability. At the beginning of time, there exists a density one of each player
type φ. Moreover, players of type φ randomize independently over the two actions A and
B such that we can use the weak law of large numbers to calculate the share of type φ
agents who play A and B as φ and 1− φ, respectively.
Proposition 1. Over time, rational player types φ = 1 who maximize their individual
survival probability, are eliminated with probability one. All agents φ = 0 who minimize
their probability of survival are also eliminated. The probability of some agents of all
other types φ ∈ (0, 1), who play strategies that are neither consistent with maximization
nor minimization, surviving to any point in time is equal to one.
Proof. Rational agents (φ = 1), who maximize their individual survival probability, choose
strategy A, with its superior survival probability P > 1/2, all the time. Hence, P t
is the probability of a rational agent surviving to period t. Indeed rationality iduces all
rational agents to play A such that the collective survival probability for the entire group of
rational agents coincides with the individual survival probability P . The long-run survival
probability of rational agents, individually and collectively, is therefore limt→∞ P
t = 0.
Second, the individual and collective survival probability for minimizing agents (φ = 0)
is (1 − P ). Hence, over time, we have limt→∞(1 − P )t = 0. Finally, irrational agents
φ ∈ (0, 1), who do not maximize: The individual survival probability of a type φ agent
is given by the convex combination Pφ + (1 − P )(1 − φ) ∈ [1 − P, P ]. That is, as
individuals, irrational agents survive with a probability that falls short of the rational
agent’s probability P . However, a share φ of irrational type φ players survives in state 0,
and a share 1− φ in state 1. The probability of some type φ players surviving from one
period to the next is therefore P + (1− P ) = 1.
Proposition 1 reflects that the extinction of rational agents is an immediate conse-
quence of the very fact that rational agents maximize their individual survival probabil-
ities. In doing so, they coordinate on the one rational answer that exists to the struggle
for survival that nature presents them with. However, since individual rationality is well-
defined in the present model, rational players all take the same bet and are thus eliminated
collectively in the rare event where technology B dominates A. Put differently, nature
rewards a diversification, which is individually irrational.
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3 Discussion
The previous result suggests that the failure of rationality originates from a lack of di-
versification. In this section, we reflect on this finding. At first sight, the binary choice
model from the previous section raises the question whether rational agents might find
some way to diversify once they can choose from more than just two actions. To address
this concern, we show that our findings also obtain in a standard capital market environ-
ment where rational agents can choose from an arbitrary number of different assets to
build diversified portfolios. Second, we emphasize the fact that the present model implies
the emergence of equilibrium biases. Third, we relate our conclusions to the literature on
individual and group fitness.
3.1 Diversification
Proposition 1 clearly shows that the survival of irrational players relies on the fact that
rational players indeed perform to the best of their ability. Accordingly, for every given
task, they come to the same optimal conclusion. And all rational players will choose the
same action A. Everyone choosing A, however, implies that rational players’ choices are
collectively perfectly correlated. This aligns their actions perfectly, which in the presence
of aggregate risks, means that they perish simultaneously. Hence, rational players, as a
collective, do not diversify. To emphasize this point, we develop a simple version of the
workhorse capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in Appendix A. In this model, investors
maximize the probability with which their individual asset returns Yj do not fall below
a minimum Y min. As Sharpe (1991) shows, the key prediction, namely that all rational
investors choose the same “market portfolio”, holds under much more general circum-
stances. That is, even though investors can choose from infinitely many different assets,
they all choose the same diversified “market portfolio”, which we call A. This portfolio
indeed maximizes their individual survival probability. Moreover, since all rational agents
choose the same optimal portfolio A, their collective survival probability is identical to
their individual survival probability. Irrational players play B. That is, they do not
diversify and select one individual asset at random. Hence, their individual survival prob-
ability falls short of that of the rational players. However, as a collective, they are fully
diversified: Regardless of how deep the over all market falls, a positive measure of irra-
tional agents will survive. Put differently, it turns out that this model’s predictions are in
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line with the simple binary choice model from Section 2. In Appendix A, we substantiate
the foregoing claims and prove
Proposition 2. All rational investors who maximize their survival probability choose the
market portfolio A. And, over time, the probability of rational investors’ funds being
closed due to catastrophic losses goes to 1. The probability with which a positive measure
of irrational investors, who individually invest all of their wealth into one randomly drawn
asset, survive to any point in time is one.
Put differently, those investors who behave according to the predictions of the capital
asset pricing model will eventually go bankrupt in one unlikely market downturn. In this
downturn, however, there are always some outlier assets, and those irrational investors
who chose these outlier assets survive the downturn.
3.1.1 Preferences and additional strategies
From the previous analysis it is clear that the population of players declines over time.
Moreover, there is no safe act that would allow agents to survive until the next period
with probability one. If we were to introduce safe acts alongside rewards to risk-taking,
which would come in the form of increased fertility in case the risky strategy pays off,
we would obtain the same results as before if rational players maximize the number of
expected offspring by playing one risky act, “A”, all the time. If rational players were to
maximize their survival probability instead, they would eventually be marginalized in a
population where other player types individually randomize over the safe and the risky
option where expected fertility is higher. Once again, the key to this finding would lie
in the observation that rational players, regardless of what their aim is, would not have
an incentive to randomize individually. Finally, we note that the same arguments would
apply if there were two groups of rational players, one maximizing the expected number
of children, the other maximizing the probability of survival.
3.2 Trembling Hand and Heterogenous Priors
The foregoing model has shown that an endogenous population of players evolves over
time. And the probability of rational players being included in this distribution goes
to zero as time evolves, leaving only agents playing trembling hand. The present model
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thus provides a framework where the often criticized trembling hand assumption of Selten
(1975) is a model outcome rather than an assumption.
In an alternative interpretation, the present model can explain the emergence of het-
erogenous priors. Suppose that all players die after one period and only those who made
the right choice have one “child”. In turn, the child of a type φ agent will, with probabil-
ity φ (respectively 1 − φ), hold the prior belief that the probability P with which action
A dominates B is P > 1/2 (P < 1/2). By the law of large numbers, we would have a
stable “sex ratio” and a share φ play A while a share 1 − φ play B. For each history of
events, agents will therefore know that they live in a society that agrees to disagree. In
this interpretation, the present model explains the empirical fact that agents “agree to
disagree”, which - as Aumann (1976) points out - is otherwise hard to justify.
3.3 Group Selection and Absolute Individual Fitness
In a different interpretation, the present model supports the concept of group selection
rather than selection based on individual absolute fitness. That is, over time, rational
agents, who are individually the fittest, perish collectively with probability one. On the
contrary, irrational agents, who are individually not capable of maximizing their survival
probabilities, prevail collectively with probability one. At the same time, the present
model does not rely on any of the traditional arguments for group selection. That is, the
model involves no public good argument. Moreover, agents do not (and cannot) act on
any altruistic motives; choosing the dominated action B does not increase the survival
probability of any of the other players.5 Nor does the model involve arguments concerning
the wastes of competition that would apply if, for example, one agent’s choice of A lowered
the other agent’s survival probabilities once they also play A. And there are no rewards
for risk-taking. The argument is not based on risk preferences or strategic considerations
either, such as prisoners dilemmas or hawk-dove tradeoffs where, even though hawks
can exploit doves, not all agents choose to be hawks since hawk-hawk encounters can
be deadly.6 Finally, rationality is costless. Instead of these previous arguments, the
present selection argument relies on the fact that nature rewards a diversification which
5Wilson (2004, 1975); Wilson and Wilson (2007), Queller (1992), Samuelson (1993) and
Eldkar and Wilson (2008) for the role of public goods, (implicit) cooperation, and altruism in the context
of group selection models.
6Wolf et al. (2007).
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rationality, with its unique predictions, cannot deliver.
4 Conclusion
Individual rationality with its unambiguous predictions makes model building operational.
Moreover, since rational agents outperform irrational ones, the forces of competition will
eliminate irrational agents over time. In the current model, rational players indeed per-
form to the best of their ability. Accordingly, for every given task, they come to the same
optimal conclusion. As discussed, if A is the well diversified “market portfolio” and B an
inferior, badly diversified portfolio, then all rational players choose the same diversified
market portfolio A. Everyone holding A, however, implies that rational players’ choices
are collectively perfectly correlated. This aligns their actions perfectly, which means in
the presence of aggregate risks, that they perish simultaneously. Hence, rational players,
as a collective, do not diversify. Accordingly, over time, they will eventually be washed
away by one unforseen regime change.
In our model, irrational agents simply invest all their wealth into one randomly chosen
asset. This strategy minimizes their individual probability of success. At the same time,
this behavior ensures that some irrational agents survive in all states of nature. Hence,
even though irrational players may be outperformed by their rational counterparts for
long periods of time, they survive those unlikely events where uncomprehensible choices
pay off.
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A Proof of Proposition 2
In this appendix, we first derive the main prediction of the CAPM, namely that all rational
players will hold the same “market portfolio”, which we call A. This portfolio minimizes
the probability with which investors suffer a “catastrophic loss”. As in the baseline model,
investors suffering catastrophic losses are eliminated from the capital market. Second, we
show that rational investors who diversify optimally have a “survival probability” that
exceeds the survival probability of irrational investors who do not diversify. Finally, we
show that a positive share of irrational investors survives even the worst market down-
turns with probability one. Rational investors on the contrary are eliminated in severe
downturns.
Market: There exists a continuum of assets:
yi = θ + ξi, i ∈ [0, 1], θ ∼ N (µ, σ2), (1)
where ξi is i.i.d. white noise ξi ∼ N (0, σ2ξ). Clearly θ represents the general “market
risk”, which is common to all assets, and ξi is the idiosyncratic risk associated with a
particular asset i. In the following, each agent j can choose a portfolio to minimize the
probability that returns Yj fall short of a minimum requirement Y
min < µ. Investors
receiving Yj < Y
min go bankrupt. Respectively, if we think of the investor as a fund
manager, the fund is closed due to poor performance if Yj < Y
min. Investors receiving
Yj > Y
min move on to the next period where the game is repeated... To substantiate the
claims from the main text, we have to show that there exists one unique optimal “market
portfolio” A, which maximizes the objective survival probability P (YA > Y
min). Finally,
without loss of generality, we normalize all assets’ prices to one, and each investor can
invest one unit of currency. To derive the optimal portfolio, we note that the investor j
can buy the following portfolios:
Yj1 = y1, Yj1 ∼ N (µ, σ2 + σ2ξ ) (2)
Yj2 =
1
2
y1 +
1
2
y2, Yj2 ∼ N (µ, σ2 + 1
2
σ2ξ ) (3)
Yj3 =
1
3
y1 +
1
3
y2 +
1
3
y3, Yj3 ∼ N (µ, σ2 + 1
3
σ2ξ ) (4)
YjN =
N∑
n=1
1
N
yn, YjN ∼ N (µ, σ + 1
N
σ2ξ ). (5)
Rational Choice: It follows from (2)-(5) that P (YjN > Y
min) = Φ
(√
1
σ2+ 1
N
σ2
ξ
(µ −
Y min)
)
, where Φ() is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution.
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Thus, the survival probability of a fund manager is monotonously increasing in N since we
assumed that µ > Y min. Accordingly, rational investors will choose N =∞ to maximize
their survival probability. That is, they include a small amount of every asset xi, i ∈ [0, 1]
in their portfolio to achieve maximum diversification. This means that all rational fund
managers choose the same “market portfolio” as predicted by the standard capital asset
pricing model. Once we call this market portfolio portfolio A, we have substantiated the
claim from the main text that all rational managers choose A, which puts their individual
and collective survival probability to PA = Φ
(√
σ2(µ− Y min)
)
.
Irrational Agents: As before, there exists a measure one of irrational players who
do not diversify. They simply invest their total wealth into one asset which they pick at
random from the continuum of assets j ∈ [0, 1]. We call this choice B. Accordingly, the
survival probability of an individual irrational manager is P (Yj > Y
min) = Φ
(√
1
σ2+σ2
ξ
(µ−
Y min)
)
< PA. The collective survival probability of a mass one of irrational players,
however, is again equal to one. That is, for every given draw θ, we have the distribution
of individual asset returns yi|θ ∼ N (θ, σ2ξ ), and there is always a positive mass P (y >
Y min|θ) = Φ
(√
1
σ2
ξ
(θ− Y min)
)
> 0 of irrational players, who receive a return in excess of
the required minimum.
Put differently, regardless of how deep the general “market”, θ, falls, there are always
some outlier assets, which deliver a return sufficient to ensure that Yi = xi > Y
min. Hence,
there are always surviving irrational agents. The same is not true for rational agents, who
hold the market portfolio A, which yields YA =
∫
[0,1]
xidi = θ+
∫
[0,1]
ξidi = θ. Or, in terms
of (5), we have limN→∞ YN = θ. That is, once θ < Y
min, which happens with probability
1− PA > 0, all rational agents perish simultaneously.
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